Steven L. Ossad

Abstract
For more than sixty-five years, participants and military historians have argued the question of whether US VI Corps commander Major General John P. Lucas should have captured the Alban Hills immediately after the successful landing at Anzio in late January 1944. This article addresses that question beginning with an examination of Lucas’s career and the circumstances under which he was selected for command of Operation SHINGLE. Next, it examines the rationale, underlying assumptions, plans, and orders issued for the campaign to ascertain where the responsibility lay for the disaster that ensued. It argues that the senior Allied commanders, especially US Fifth Army commander Lt. General Mark Clark and 15th Army Group commander General Sir Harold Alexander, bear the full burden of failure. They countenanced the selection of a man they knew to be unfit for command for purely expedient reasons and allowed a complex amphibious operation to proceed in spite of insufficient planning, resources, and rehearsal. Ignoring basic internal inconsistencies between the British and American positions about SHINGLE’s purpose, immediate goal, and ultimate objective, Fifth Army then issued written orders that were intentionally ambiguous and designed to give the top commanders cover in the event the operation foundered. When that happened, they laid the blame on Lucas. The controversy over the Alban Hills was a “straw man” argument and irrelevant in assessing Lucas’s role at Anzio. Many have rightly used the word scapegoat; indeed, it is difficult to find a more cynical example of perfidy in the Allied high command during World War II. The treatment of John Lucas – an honorable and brave soldier who should have been hailed a great hero after Salerno but instead languishes in the shadow of history – contains a warning that will always be relevant.

Hitler called it an “abscess.” Winston Churchill, the chief sponsor and loudest cheerleader for the endeavor, called it a “disaster” and admitted that it was his “worst moment in the war.” Lt. General Mark Clark, the American commander, described it as a “barren little strip of hell.” American GI’s, their British brothers-in-arms, as well as their German adversaries had more profane and gruesome descriptions. The bloody four-month agony of Anzio was one of the most difficult and costly campaigns ever fought by an Anglo-American army. In spite of its disappointing results, it was also a heroic stage upon which the grim determination, bravery and sacrifice of soldiers from both sides was displayed. In just one measure of gallantry and courage, of the nearly seventy Medals of Honor awarded to ground soldiers fighting in Italy, one in four went to men at Anzio.

Updated: February 12, 2013