Steven L. Ossad

Xenophon, son of Gryllos of Athens, was a practical man with a talent for survival against very long odds. An expert on horsemanship and an experienced combat veteran, he gained his reputation as a “strategos” (στρατηγός), or, general, in the lands and twisted politics of the early 4th Century BC Persian Empire. His memoir of his greatest adventure, Anabasis, the Retreat of Ten Thousand, remains one of the classics of world literature, a terrific story of a group of desperate men facing a long, bloody, seemingly hopeless retreat surrounded by ruthless enemies who are at home in a hostile land.

Born into a politically inactive, but noble family of Athens in 431 BC, Xenophon served as a young cavalry officer from the deme of Erchia, from about 409 BC. He was at least an observor and probably a participant in the political conflict surrounding the murderous reign of the Thirty Tyrants. A frequent companion of Socrates, and at home in the circle of young aristocrats who flocked around him, Xenophon had an opportunity as a high ranking mercenary, and after consulting the oracle, left Athens in 401 BC to pursue his fortune.

Decades later, around 365 BC, he wrote the Hipparchicus, often translated as "Cavalry Commander", but actually a discourse on the specific duties and responsibilities of an Athenian commander of cavalry.

At the time he wrote, certain war loomed between Thebes and Athens, which had then been at peace for some time and was reportedly suffering from a decline in the quality of its standing cavalry. The Hipparchicus was intended to convey Xenophon’s advice about how to restore the force to its previous excellence. It incidentally also contains the only surviving extended description of the organization and many other details of the Athenian cavalry, including its very important ceremonial functions. Any viewer of the surviving Parthenon sculptures needs no further evidence of the importance of the cavalry to the full life of a city-state like Athens.

The tone and specific suggestions of the Hipparchicus echo the concerns of the time when alliances were once again shifting, and Xenophon saw an opportunity to press his advantage of great knowledge and reputation to gain favor in his home city. Fortune favored Xenophon in the end. He reached a degree of reconciliation with Athens including a revocation of his degree of banishment, and reportedly ended his life in relative comfort in Corinth. The very respectable showing of the Athenian cavalry during the Battle of Mantinea (361 BC) just a few years after circulation of the Hipparchicus, undoubtedly reflects the debate about the old professional’s suggestions.

Xenophon’s reputation as a soldier, memoirist, and historian has been established by centuries of authority, and his texts have for two thousand years been valued greatly by students of the military history of Classical Greece. As a historian, however, Xenophon’s contributions have been justifiably dwarfed by his predecessor, Thucydides. Still, Xenophon’s Hellenica does complete the narrative of the Peloponnesian War and its aftermath in credible fashion - picking up the story at 411 BC and taking it to the Battle of Mantinea in 362 BC.

While rarely regarded as a first-rank philosopher, or a critical valuable source about Socrates, that issue is moot in this discussion. The Hipparchicus is a “how to” practical book of military advice with some innovative ideas – like, for example, permanently attaching light infantry units directly to cavalry - but it has no grand theoretical intent and could never be read as a philosophical text.

Having spent a half century looking at life from horseback, Xenophon turned in retirement to consider the preoccupations of a Hipparch, a cavalry commander in Athens, in peace and war. His credentials for addressing those issues are beyond dispute. While the original purpose and writing style of the Hipparchicus may be narrow in scope, even shamelessly self-aggrandizing, the book reflects the author’s vast experience of cavalry and command, men and horses. It should be read, at least in part, as a response in word and actions to questions posed by Socrates to another young man who had just been appointed Hipparch; Xenophon gives the conversation the authority of his own presence in his Memorabilia, Book III, iii, 1-2.

“Again, when someone had been chosen a leader of cavalry, I remember that Socrates conversed with him in the following manner:

“Young man,” he said, “can you tell us why you hankered after a cavalry command? I presume it was not to be first of the cavalry in the charge; for that privilege belongs to the mounted archers; at any rate they ride ahead of their commanders even.”

“True.”

“Nor was it to get yourself known either. Even madmen are known to everyone.”

“True again.”

“But perhaps you think you can hand over the cavalry in better condition to the polis when you retire, and can do something for the good of the polis as a cavalry leader, in case there is any occasion to employ that arm?”

“Yes, certainly,” said he. (Xenophon, Memorabilia, III, iii, 1-2)

The standing cavalry of Athens was a 1,000 man force organized into ten “regiments” each raised from a levy drawn from the demes (pl. δῆμος), or districts, of Attica and the city of Athens. The cavalry was commanded by two equal rank “hipparchs” (pl. ιππαρχικος), each responsible for commanding five regiments, or one half of the force. The hundred man unit was commanded by a “phylarch” (pl. φυλαρχος, from υλή, "clan, race, people", derived from φύεσθαι "to descend, to originate"). The term is translated as “colonel,” but that is misleading in modern usage. The entire cavalry force of Athens was equivalent in size, organization, and impact on the battlefield to a Civil War-era cavalry brigade, eg. Union Col. John Farnsworth’s 2nd brigade of cavalry at Antietam (1862) was 850 men, with a far higher authorized strength.

The typical equipment of a Athenian heavy cavalry trooper of the late 5th and 4th centuries BC, was light leather armor, helmet, throwing javelins, and defensive edged weapons. Light cavalry consisted of mounted archers, who frequently rode at the front of columns or line of cavalry. Lightly armed infantry were also occasionaly used as auxiliaries. The saddles did not include stirrups, nor were horses shod, so some of the maneuvers described in the text were difficult to perform, including accurate javelin throwing.

The cavalry was funded and managed by the Council of Athens, and its fortunes often rose and fell with the political realities of the time. At all times, the cavalry played a major role in religious celebrations, especially the annual rites related to Athena, so its professionalism in performing public demonstrations was important to the civic life of the city. By 365 BC, its strength was down by a third, and reports of low troop moral and poor quality horses were widespread and had reached Xenophon. Some of the advice offered in the Hipparchicus relates to details of those reports and are reflected in specific recommendations. (Hipparchicus, I, 13-16)

The North frieze contains some sixty horsemen carved over nineteen blocks; the South frieze features the same number carved over twenty-four blocks. Ten groups of six riders each in the South cavalcade, distinguished by distinctive dress, probably represents the organization of the Athenian cavalry into ten regiments.